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In this paper we analyse household members’ reactions in case of unforeseen negative income 
shocks due to a transition into unemployment and/or into income support. More specifically, we 
estimate the impact of an income loss suffered by one household member on the probability that 
another household member – not necessarily the wife - transit from out of the labour force into 
employment or into workforce. Since in a lifecycle setting the labour supply of secondary 
workers is also affected by credit constraints, we take into account financial wealth and liabilities 
as well as a measure of household illiquidity due to housing. To perform our analyses, we use a 
discrete choice model and data drawn from the Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income and 
Wealth (SHIW) over the period 2004-2012, so as to include the effects of the Great Recession. 
Even after accounting for standard socio-economic controls, results show significant reactions to 
income shocks, especially during the recession. As for portfolio controls, we find a significant 
difference (mostly in terms of intercept, but also of slope) between the level of illiquidity and 
labour market participation for households hit/not hit by a shock.  
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During the first year of the Great Recession, between 2008 and 2009, the GDP of the Euro (17) 
area dropped by 4.4 per cent (OECD stats); in the following months, unemployment rates soared, 
especially in southern European countries (Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal), and the value of 
real and financial assets declined sharply. What began as a financial crisis sparked by the US 
housing market bubble (and the abuse of subprime loans), soon turned into the deepest recession 
since the 1930s. As a consequence, many households, especially those who believed that the 
effects of the shocks were permanent, were forced to reduce consumption expenditures 
(Christelis et al. 2012). While different governments in different countries chose more or less 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies to counteract the effect of the crisis, at the household 
level individuals adopted a series of strategies to cope with financial strain due to a loss of 
income.  
 
From a theoretical point of view, a standard intertemporal budget constraint from a life cycle 
model posits that individuals facing an unforeseen negative income shock can react in different 
ways. Specifically, they may increase labour supply, reduce planned consumption, resort to 
borrowing (either from credit institutions or other family members and friends), or use their 
saving (Browning and Lusardi, 1996). The cited reactions need not be alternative, however an 
increase in labour supply, either at the extensive margin (from not participating in the labour 
market to participating) or intensive margin (increasing the number of hours worked) depends on 
the relative price and effectiveness of all the alternatives. As stressed by Lundberg (1985), when 
credit constraints are binding, and in the absence of savings (or in the presence of liabilities), 
increasing labour supply, or at least trying to, is more likely. The recent increase in the number 
of active persons in Italy, despite the recession, seems to suggest that such a reaction could be 
taking place: among women aged 35-44 years, for example, from 2008 to 2012 the activity rate 
increased from 67.8% to 69%.1  
 
                                                 




The aim of this paper is to analyse the potential increase of labour supply as a coping strategy 
against income loss also taking into account the role played by portfolio illiquidity. More 
specifically, we assess whether inactive individuals who are part of a household hit by an income 
shock are more likely to transit into the workforce. By income shock we mean the event that at 
least one household member (not necessarily the head of household) transited into 
unemployment and/or one household member started receiving some kind of work-related 
income support (income from redundancy benefits, mobility benefits and unemployment 
benefits). To this end, we use a discrete choice model and, besides standard socio-economic and 
demographic variables, we control for the role of wealth and portfolio illiquidity due to housing.   
 
We use data drawn from the Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) 
over the period 2004-2012, so as to include the effects of the great recession. Italy lends itself 
particularly well to the empirical investigation just outlined for three main reasons: first, the role 
of intra-family transfers is especially relevant, since “children” live with their parents until well 
into their thirties, hence benefiting from (as well as potentially contributing to) parental income 
and wealth. Second, Italians are more able to smooth consumption and less bound by credit 
constraints because they are savers (even though the observed level of savings has substantially 
decreased in the last decade) and they have very low private debt and a high homeownership rate, 
therefore portfolio controls may play an important role. Finally, the low stock market 
participation of Italian households (Guiso and Jappelli, 2009) meant that the majority of them 
were shielded from huge capital losses due to the financial turmoil (Brandolini et al., 2012).2 
 
Our contribution is twofold. First, we study not just spousal reaction to a household income 
shock, but the reaction of any other household member. Because of the rigidity of the Italian 
labour market, we consider an increase in labour supply at the extensive margin, so our 
estimation sample consists only of inactive household members, mainly housewives/ 
homemakers and students, who may have an (extra) incentive to participate in the labour market 
                                                 
2 It is also worth mentioning that one quarter of total household income comes from pensions and other public 
transfers which have not been touched by the crisis – except for a two year freeze of indexation for pensions up to 
three times the minimum value – therefore families in which an older member is present can benefit from his or her 




once another household member experienced an income shock. Since students may enter the 
labour force independently of the income shock when they finish studying, besides controlling 
for age and education, we carry out a robustness check and split the sample according to the two 
main inactive categories. Second, we specifically account, among portfolio controls, for the role 
played by portfolio illiquidity due to housing. We estimate both the impact of portfolio illiquidity 
itself on the probability of increasing labour supply, and we assess whether the role of portfolio 
illiquidity differs between households hit and those not hit by an income shock.   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the related 
literature; Section 3 describes the dataset and provides some descriptive statistics that motivate 
our research question. Section 4 illustrates the empirical analyses and discusses results. 
Sensitivity analyses and robustness checks are presented in Section 5.  Last Section concludes.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
When studying mechanisms to cope with income drops within a household, it is important to 
consider intra-household transfers, which may take the form of monetary transfers as well as 
labour supply reactions of another household member. The idea that one inactive household 
member may increase his or her labour supply to compensate for the unemployment of another 
household member is generally referred to as the “added worker effect”, a concept which dates 
as far back as the 1940s (Humphrey, 1940) and has received large attention by the economic 
literature. Most authors focus on couples and the wife’s response to husband’s job loss, while 
only a few consider the reaction of other members, and the results are still mixed. For instance, 
Gong (2010) finds a positive effect of husband’s job loss on their wives’ participation and 
working hours for a sample of Australian women, although the latter effect overshadows the 
former, since it is harder for women who are out of the labour force to enter the market than for 
women already working to increase their hours. Bryan and Longhi (2013) find little evidence in 
support of a “household insurance” mechanism for British couples in case of unpredicted job loss. 




job searches increase in response to job loss during a recession, they are not necessarily 
successful.  
 
Household members’ reactions likely depend on the level and availability of public transfers. 
Authors like Cullen and Gruber (2000) and Bingley and Walker (2001) highlight the importance 
of unemployment insurance and the incentives embedded in the system. Using US data, Cullen 
and Gruber estimate that spouses would increase their total hours of work by 30 per cent in 
response to an income shock if unemployment insurance did not exist. Bingley and Walker use 
UK data to exploit the 1996 welfare reform, which replaced the existing system of 
unemployment benefits with the Job Seeker’s Allowance, and found similar effects. A couple of 
studies, Skoufias and Parker (2005) and Beylis (2012), deal with similar issues using Mexican 
data. The authors claim that because in Mexico, like in other developing countries, the access to 
credit is poor and unemployment insurance is non-existent, women are more likely to increase 
their labour supply in response to their husbands’ job loss, and indeed both articles find a large 
and significant added worker effect. Benito and Saleheen (2012) consider the impact of a 
financial rather than income shock and find a positive response in terms of labour supply, mainly 
at the intensive margin, for a sample of British households.  
 
Portfolio features may well play a role in determining labour transitions. Blundell et al. (1997) 
give the theoretical background to relate wealth and labour market transitions positing that a 
higher level of wealth decreases the probability of a transition from non-employment into 
employment. Bloemen (2002) presents an empirical study for the Netherlands on the relation 
between wealth and labour market transitions, where to define wealth he uses the levels of net 
assets, and finds a negative relationship between wealth at the beginning of the period and the 
probability to remain employed/transit into employment. Another strand of literature looks at the 
connection between mortgage commitments and female labour supply (e.g. Del Boca and 
Lusardi, 2003 and Fortin, 1995) and finds a positive relationship. 
 
A few recent studies, which fit within the literature on household financial fragility, investigate 




cope with financial shocks that may be due to temporary and unexpected income drops. Lusardi 
et al (2011) use a self-assessed measure of financial fragility and study US households’ ability to 
come up with $2,000 in 30 days, compare their coping ability with that of households in seven 
other industrialized countries and also look at a “pecking order” of coping mechanisms (savings, 
family/friends, traditional credit, work more, selling possession). Brunetti et al. (2012) propose a 
novel characterization of financial fragility that is not necessarily linked to indebtedness and is 
free of subjectivity bias and use it to assess the importance of household portfolio illiquidity in 
determining difficulties to cope with unexpected expenditure needs, thereby including temporary 
income losses.  
 
Our analyses contribute to these strands of literature in two major ways. With respect to the 
“added worker effect” literature, we study not just spousal reaction to a household income shock, 
but the reaction of any other household member. With respect to the literature on wealth and 
labour transitions, we account for portfolio composition, and, specifically, we control for the role 
played by portfolio illiquidity due to housing, in line with some of the literature on household 
financial fragility.  
 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics  
3.1. Sample Selection and descriptive statistics 
Our investigation draws from the Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) waves 
2004-2012. The SHIW is a biannual survey, conducted by the Bank of Italy on a representative 
sample of the Italian population and includes a wealth of information on socio-demographic 
variables, a detailed description of households’ assets and work histories. We kept only 
individuals present in at least two waves, so that we can exploit the panel component, and we 
restrict our sample to individuals aged between 15 and 65; however, we control for the presence 
of children under the age of five within the household, as well as for the presence of adults aged 





In this Section we present a few descriptive statistics of household income, first at an aggregate 
level and then distinguishing between households hit and not hit by an income shock as defined 
in Section 3.3.  
 
3.2. Changes in total household income and its components   
In order to understand the income dynamics during the period considered, we first calculate the 
mean level of total household disposable income and its separate components for each wave. 
More specifically, we calculate average Payroll Income, Self-employment Income, Pension 
Income, Transfer Income, Property Income and Income from Financial Assets. All income types 
are defined in Appendix A.   
 
From table 1 we notice how payroll and pension income follow the same trend as total household 
disposable income, peaking in 2008, experiencing a large drop in 2010 and then decreasing again, 
but less than in the previous period 3 . Conversely, income from self-employment shows a 
decreasing trend from the beginning of the period in 2004 till 2012. Transfer income is 
decreasing before 2008, and increasing right after, which can be seen as a sign of the economic 
crisis. Property income and income from financial assets show an unstable trend. Property 
income appears to represent a high portion of total household disposable income, but it has to be 
recalled that it consists of two components: while actual rents increase in the last biennium, 
imputed rents decline markedly between 2010 and 2012, possibly reflecting people’s negative 
expectations on the housing market. Income from financial assets in 2010 is shown as negative 
because interests paid, most likely on mortgages, are higher than interests earned.  
 
In table 2 we simply calculate the wave-on-wave variation of the income variables summarised 
in table 1, to indicate even more clearly the potential impact of the recession. Indeed, between 
2008 and 2010 we have the first and largest drop in both payroll income and total household 
disposable income (-5.9% and -5.4% respectively), and the negative trend continues into the 
                                                 
3 Please note that our sample does not include people aged over 65, so the variation in pension income is not meant 




following biennium (-1.7% and -2.4% respectively). Between 2010 and 2012 payroll income 
decreases less than total household disposable income, possibly reflecting the large negative 
variation in income from self-employment (-12.2%).  
 
Table 1: Aggregate household income and its components (CPI adjusted 2012 prices, in €)  
€ 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Payroll Income  19,941 21,068 21,344 20,077 19,740 
Self-employment Income 6,515 6,493 6,219 6,030 5,463 
Self-employment Income 5,623 5,702 5,424 5,328 4,676 
Entrepreneurial Income 892 791 795 703 787 
Pension Income 4,508 4,601 5,199 4,527 4,462 
Pensions 4,493 4,532 5,158 4,515 4,439 
Arrears 16 69 41 12 23 
Transfer Income(a) 223 199 179 267 424 
Property Income 7,547 7,236 7,378 7,587 7,012
Actual Rents 502 307 346 384 400 
Imputed Rents 7,044 6,929 7,032 7,203 6,611 
Income from Financial Assets -30 108 -44 -327 45 
Total Household Disposable Income 38,832 39,712 40,308 38,130 37,203 
Obs 6,305 8,227 8,682 8,714 6,818 
(a) We have not reported the sub-categories gifts, alimonies and other transfers. 
Source: SHIW 2004-2012, data weighted using household sampling weights.  
 
Table 2: Percentage change in aggregate household income and its components  
(CPI adjusted 2012 prices) 
 2004-2006 2006-2008 2008-2010 2010-2012
Delta Payroll Income  5.7% 1.3% -5.9% -1.7% 
Delta Self-employment Income -0.4% -4.2% -3.0% -9.4% 
Self-employment Income 1.4% -4.9% -1.8% -12.2% 
Entrepreneurial Income -11.3% 0.6% -11.6% 12.0% 
Delta Pension Income 2.1% 13.0% -12.9% -1.4% 
Pensions 0.9% 13.8% -12.5% -1.7% 
Arrears 343.6% -40.7% -70.5% 89.7% 
Delta Transfer Income(a) -11.0% -9.9% 48.8% 59.0% 
Delta Property Income -4.1% 2.0% 2.8% -7.6% 
Actual Rents -38.8% 12.5% 11.0% 4.3% 
Imputed Rents -1.6% 1.5% 2.4% -8.2% 
Delta Income from Financial Assets(b) -459.1% -140.8% 642.6% -113.8% 
Delta Total Household Disposable Income 2.3% 1.5% -5.4% -2.4% 
Obs(c) 6,208 6,691 6,875 6,802 
(a) We have not reported the sub-categories gifts, alimonies and other transfers. 
Note: Since we are calculating variations, observations from the first year are missing. All delta variables are calculated as 
the % variation from the previous wave (xt-xt-1)/xt-1. 





Aggregate measures, however, do not take into account an important source of heterogeneity: 
some households experienced an income shock and some did not. Therefore, we distinguish 
between households hit and those not hit by a shock and we see to what extent the variation in 
household income follows a different pattern for the two groups. 
 
3.3. Defining households hit by an income shock  
In order to identify households hit by an income shock, we build a binary variable equal to one if 
at least one household member transited from employment into unemployment, at least one 
household member started receiving some kind of income support (income from redundancy 
benefits, mobility benefits and unemployment benefits) or both, and zero otherwise. We consider 
the receipt of work-related benefits as an income shock, since in Italy many workers of firms 
suffering from severe reductions in their activity receive redundancy or mobility benefits, but are 
still classified as employed, even though the probability of working again may be low. Because 
redundancy/mobility benefits cover only a percentage of the initial wage, family income is 
reduced and therefore other family members may react by searching for a job.  
 
Between 2012 and 2010, 13.6 per cent of the families in our sample were hit by a shock 
compared to 4.9 per cent in 2004-2006. More specifically, a transition from employment into 
unemployment is present in roughly 7.2 per cent of families in 2012, compared to 4.4 per in 
2006-2006; while 6.2 per cent of families in 2012 report at least one member who started 
receiving benefits, as opposed to 1.2 per cent in 2004-2006 (see table 3). The categories do not 
totally overlap, since we have households in which only one of the two shocks (unemployment 
or benefits) is presents, and households in which both of them are present at the same time.  
 
Table 3: Individuals living in households which experienced / did not experience an income 
shock, by year 
 2004-2006 2006-2008 2008-2010 2010-2012 
Income shock (composite) 
between t and t-1 
4.9% 6.1% 5.8% 11.7% 
Only one shock: lost work 4.4% 4.7% 3.3% 7.2% 
Only one shock: benefits 1.2% 1.9% 3.2% 6.2% 
     
Obs 7,650 8,262 8,292 6,361 





Figure 1 shows the average income variation for households hit and not hit by an income shock. 
Predictably, payroll and self-employment income show large negative variations in all periods 
for households hit by a shock (except for a small positive variation in self-employment income 
between 2008 and 2010), while the variation in transfer income for this group is always positive. 
Interestingly, since the beginning of the recession the variation in payroll and self-employment 
income becomes negative, albeit small, also for households not hit by an income shock, however 
income variations for this group are quite small. 
 
Figure 1: Variation in household income components  
(in CPI adjusted euros, by wave and income shock) 
1 Only wage, no fringe benefits. 
2 Only pensions, no arrears 
3 Only financial assistance (no gifts or alimonies) 
Source: Our elaborations from SHIW 2004-2012. 
 
One of the intuitions we draw from Figure 1 is that the severe loss of payroll income for 
households hit by a shock is far from being compensated by an equivalent increase in other types 
of income, especially transfer income, therefore it is plausible to expect some kind of reaction at 
the household level. Since individuals would rationally try to avoid a drop in consumption, they 
can respond by using up their savings, if they have any, by borrowing, if they can access credit, 





In the next section we will focus on the latter strategy, while also taking into account the role of 
wealth by specifically including portfolio and wealth measures. 
 
4. Empirical Strategy 
 
We are interested in the reaction to a household income shock from previously inactive 
household members, therefore we start by defining who is considered inactive and  build a binary 
variable equal to 1 if the individual was a housewife/homemaker, a student, a voluntary worker 
or if he or she lived of independent means (i.e. rentier) when he or she first enters our sample. 
Pensioners or recipients of non-work-related benefits are excluded. Since we have an unbalanced 
panel, the first year does not correspond to 2004, but can be any successive year.4 As we can see 
in table 4, roughly 52.2 per cent of the people who were inactive at time 1 were students, 47.3 
per cent were housewives and only 0.5 per cent were either rentiers or voluntary workers. Given 
these numbers, we carry out a few robustness checks on the two categories housewives and 
students in Section 5. 
 
We then define the dependent variable Employedit as a dichotomous variable taking the value of 
1 if the individual i transited from out of the workforce into employment at time t and zero 
otherwise; if at time t+1, the individual who experienced the transition remains in employment, 
the binary variable takes the value of 1. If the same individual transits out of employment (at t+1), 
the binary variable takes the value of zero. This gives us a total of 986 observations (for 587 
individuals). Because a transition into employment is likely to be more difficult during a 
recession, we also define a second dependent variable, Activeit, as a dichotomous variable taking 
the value of 1 if the individual transited from out of the workforce into the workforce (i.e. either 
employed or actively seeking work) at time t or if he or she remained part of the workforce after 
a transition, and zero otherwise, for a total of 2,005 observations (for 1,162 individuals).  
 
                                                 
4 A technical note: the first year of inactivity cannot be 2012 because in that case the individual would only be 




Even though the percentage of women who are inactive in the first year is 2.7 times higher than 
the percentage of men in the same situation (73% vs. 27%), only 14 % of these women 
experience a transition into the workforce as opposed to 25% of men (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4: Estimation sample and employment transitions, by gender 
 Male Female All % of 
 Obs Indiv. Obs Indiv. Obs Indiv. Female 
out of All 
Inactive at t= 1 2,041 951 5,584 2,556 7,625 3,507 73% 
of which students 2,009 937 1,953 948 3,962 1,885 49% 
of which housewives 4 2 3,618 1,603 3,622 1,605 100% 
of which voluntary workers 23 10 10 4 33 14 30% 
of which rentiers 5 2 3 1 8 3 38% 
Transited into employment  411 238 575 349 986 587 58% 
Transited into workforce  878 476 1,127 686 2,005 1,162 56% 
Remained inactive  1,123 685 4,260 2,180 5,383 2,865 79% 
Success rate into employment  25%  14%    
Success rate into workforce  50%  27%    
Source: Own elaborations from SHIW data. 
Note: totals do not add up since the same individual may experience more than one transition. For instance, the same individual 
can start out of the workforce, remain out for a year, then transit into the workforce/employment. 
 
 
We estimate the following equation: 
 
 |1|01 11  iitijtijtit InactivexkIncomeShocy     (1.1) 
 
where  
yit is Employedit in a first specification, or Activeit in a second specification; Income shockijt=1 if 
the individual i is part of a household j in which at least one member has suffered an income 
shock (either became unemployed or received income support or both) from time t onwards; xit is 
a vector of covariates to control for heterogeneity; εit the error, which we assume to be normally 
distributed, and inactivei1=1 if individual i at time 1 is inactive.  
 
The vector of covariates x includes a dummy variable equal to one if the individual is a female, a 
second order polynomial in age, dummies for marital status (couple as the baseline), a dummy 
for the presence of children under the age of 5 within the household and one for the presence of 




and medium educational attainment (low education as the baseline), year and geographical 
dummies. A list of all variables used, their definition and summary statistics of the estimation 
sample are provided in Appendix B. 
 
Since we are using a panel, our sample contains several observations on the same individuals 
which are not independent of each another, therefore we control for it by clustering standard 
errors at the individual level.  
 
4.1. The role of income shocks 
Table 5 highlights the role of an income shock and reports the results from regression (1.1) in the 
two specifications, whereby in the first the dependent variable is the probability of becoming 
employed and in the second the probability of becoming active.5 
 
These results confirm our intuition that households hit by a shock respond by increasing labour 
supply, as the probability of a transition is 7.7 percentage points higher compared to households 
that were not hit by an income shock. The effect is even stronger if we consider the probability 
of a transition into the workforce, with individuals living in a household hit by an income shock 
9.3 percentage points more likely to become active than individuals living in households in 
which nobody suffered an income shock. Despite the fact that most individuals who transit from 
inactivity into either employment or the workforce are women, their relative success rate - as 
measured by the percentage of women who experience a transition over total women out of the 
workforce - compared to men is much lower (Table 4), therefore it is not surprising to find a 
negative sign on the marginal effect for the female dummy. From Table 5, we also see that the 
probability of a transition increases with age (in a concave fashion) and is higher for people who 
are not married. It is also significantly increasing with years of education (at the same age) and 
for those who live in the Northern area of Italy, where the number of job opportunities is greater.  
 
                                                 
5 Since our regressor of interest, Income Shock, is a binary variable, interpreting the marginal effects (at means) is 
straightforward: the coefficient is just the difference between the predicted probabilities of a transition, conditional 
on other covariates, for households hit by a shock and households not hit by a shock, holding all other variables at 




Table 5: Probability of a transition from out of the workforce into the workforce 
Pr(Y=1) Y=1: Employed Y=1: Active 
 Coeff MEMs Coeff MEMs 
Income shock 0.240*** 0.077*** 0.235*** 0.093*** 
 (0.07) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) 
Demographics   
Female -0.316*** -0.095*** -0.321*** -0.127*** 
 (0.07) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) 
Age  0.180*** 0.009*** 0.201*** 0.009*** 
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
Age squared(a) -0.002***  -0.003***  
 (0.00)  (0.00)  
Single 0.696*** 0.203*** 1.029*** 0.386*** 
 (0.14) (0.04) (0.13) (0.05) 
Divorced 0.454* 0.121 0.938*** 0.351*** 
 (0.24) (0.08) (0.21) (0.08) 
Widow(er) 0.478 0.128 0.786** 0.291** 
 (0.38) (0.12) (0.32) (0.13) 
With children aged <5 in HH 0.023 0.007 -0.092 -0.036 
 (0.12) (0.04) (0.10) (0.04) 
At least one over 65 in HH -0.049 -0.015 0.142* 0.056* 
 (0.09) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) 
Household size -0.054* -0.016* -0.020 -0.008 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Head 0.175** 0.053** 0.108 0.043 
 (0.08) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) 
Graduate 0.296*** 0.089*** 0.514*** 0.203*** 
 (0.10) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) 
Secondary Education 0.229*** 0.069*** 0.222*** 0.088*** 
 (0.07) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) 
Resident in the Centre -0.171** -0.060** 0.050 0.020 
 (0.08) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) 
Resident in the South -0.589*** -0.179*** -0.094* -0.037* 
 (0.06) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) 
Cons -4.278***  -4.700***  
 (0.39)  (0.35)  
Year YES  YES  
# observations 7,822  7,822  
# individuals 3,582  3,582  
Pseudo R2 0.120  0.173  
P value 0.000  0.000  
χ2 321.87  816.96  
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.01, ** p<0.005, *** p<0.001 
The marginal effects (MEMs) are calculated at the average values of the covariates in the sample.  






4.2. The role of income shocks at different ages 
In order to better understand the role of age in explaining transitions into employment or into the 
workforce in the presence of a family income shock, we look at interactions. Because we are 
estimating a nonlinear model, the best way to represent the effect of income shock and age is to 
show the MEMs at representative values (of age). Table 6 shows that the income shock induces a 
change in labour supply also for middle ages, and not only for the younger generations. However, 
while the effect of the shock is significant for nearly all age classes in the case of the transition 
into employment (it loses significance only after age 50), in the case of the passage from 
inactivity to the workforce, it ceases to be relevant after reaching middle age.  
 
Using the estimated coefficients, Fig. 2 plots how the adjusted probabilities of a transition into 
employment or into the workforce change with age (Fig. 2), with and without an income shock. 
Figure 2 clearly shows that the probability of a transition into employment or into the workforce 
is concave in age and higher in the presence of an income shock (except for transition into the 




Table 6: Probability of a transition from out of the workforce into workforce 
interacting income shock and age 
Marginal effect of income shock at representative ages 
Pr(Y=1) Y=1: Employed Y=1: Active 
Income Shock at age 17 0.019* 0.079*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
Income Shock at age 23 0.044** 0.112*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) 
Income Shock at age 29 0.066*** 0.106*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) 
Income Shock at age 35 0.076*** 0.079*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Income Shock at age 41 0.075*** 0.049* 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Income Shock at age 47 0.068** 0.018 
 (0.04) (0.03) 
Income Shock at age 53 0.054 -0.011 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Income Shock at age 59 0.035 -0.024 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Income Shock at age 65 0.015 -0.015 
 (0.02) (0.01) 
Year YES YES 
Demographics YES YES 
# observations 7,822 7,626 
# individuals 3,582 3,507 
The marginal effects (MEMs) are calculated at the average values of the covariates in the sample.  
All models include the following controls: dummy variable equal to one if the individual is a female, a second order polynomial 
in age, dummies for marital status (couple as the baseline), a dummy for the presence of children under the age of 5 within the 
household, a dummy for the presence of an adult aged 65 or over in the household, household size, dummy for head of household, 
dummies for high and medium educational attainment (low education as the baseline), year and geographical dummies. 
 
Figure 2 : Differential adjusted probabilities of a transition into the workforce at 
representative values of age, by Income Shock 




4.3. Accounting for portfolio features 
Portfolio features may well play a role in determining the decision of inactive household 
members to become active when an income shock is suffered by somebody in the family, in 
analogy with the literature on wealth and labour market transitions recalled in Section 2.  
 
In order to control for such potential portfolio effects, we add 3 extra controls to equation (1.1). 
The first is related portfolio illiquidity and is meant to capture the role of housing, which 
represents the dominant asset in the average Italian household portfolio. To this end, in line with 
Brunetti et al. (2012) we define “illiquidity due to housing” as the ratio of the value of the first 
home over total (gross) wealth so that the indicator ranges from 0 to 1. Following the empirical 
literature on wealth and labour transitions, we control for the amount of financial assets and 
liabilities measured in 10,000 euros. Financial assets include deposits, government and other 
securities and trade credits or credit due from other households; financial liabilities include 
liabilities to banks and financial companies (incl. mortgages), trade debt and debts towards other 
households.  
 
We then estimate the following equation: 
 
 |1|01 111   iitjtijtijtit inactiveWxkIncomeShocy     (1.2) 
 
where yit, Income shockijt, xit are the variables we have already specified, and Wjt is a vector of 
portfolio controls lagged by one period, including the illiquidity index. Note that portfolio 
controls are at household and not individual level. 
 
Table 7 (second and fourth columns) shows that even after including portfolio controls the 
results remain stable, since individuals living in a household hit by a shock are still significantly 
more likely to transit both into employment (+8.5 ppts) and into the workforce (+9.1ppts). If we 
focus on the direct effect of portfolio controls, we see that they are not significant in explaining 
transition into employment, but they are relevant in explaining the decision to become active. As 
expected, the level of financial assets in the previous period reduces the probability of entering 




(Blundell et. al, 1997; Bloemen, 2002). The negative sign of the coefficient of the degree of 
illiquidity due to housing could be explained in principle by two main reasons, both discouraging 
participation: housing provides income or collateral for consumer credit (Benito, 2009) and/or 
owning a house hinders job mobility (see Battu et al. 2008).  
 
Since portfolio illiquidity may have a differential effect for households hit/not hit by a shock, we 
also look at interactions. Table 8 indicates that portfolio illiquidity due to housing plays a role in 
connection with the income shocks. The intensity of the reaction increases, although mildly, with 
illiquidity, and more significantly so for people looking for a job. While there is no significant 
difference at very low illiquidity levels between households hit/not hit by a shock, at higher 
levels of illiquidity (from 0.2 onwards) households hit by a shock are significantly more likely to 
transit into employment or into the workforce compared with households in which nobody 
experienced an income shock. The result is consistent with the literature on household financial 
fragility: Brunetti et al. (2012) stress portfolio illiquidity due to excessive housing as a source of 
financial fragility for Italian households.  
 
The coefficients for the adjusted predicted probabilities are plotted in Figure 3. We see that, 
although small, the degree of illiquidity due to housing makes a difference. For individuals living 
in households not hit by an income shock, the association between illiquidity and the probability 
of any occupational transition is negative. By contrast, for the other group of individuals, 
illiquidity does not appear to really matter for transitions into the workforce, while it is mildly 
but positively associated with the probability of transition into employment. Hence, for people 
hit by a household income shock, it seems that the effects of housing mentioned above (i.e. 
collateral for consumer credit as in Benito (2009) or discouraging mobility as in Battu et al., 






Table 7: Probability of a transition from out of the workforce into the workforce with 
portfolio controls 
Pr(Y=1) Y=1: Employed Y=1: Active 
 MEMs MEMs MEMs MEMs 
Income shock 0.077*** 0.085*** 0.093*** 0.091*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Demographics     
Female -0.095*** -0.095*** -0.127*** -0.122*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Age / Age squared(a) 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Single 0.203*** 0.199*** 0.386*** 0.397*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Divorced 0.121 0.115 0.351*** 0.302*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
Widow(er) 0.128 0.105 0.291** 0.245 
 (0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15) 
With children aged <5 in HH 0.007 0.012 -0.036 -0.029 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
At least one over 65 in HH -0.015 -0.015 0.056* 0.058* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Household size -0.016* -0.016* -0.008 -0.006 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Head 0.053** 0.057** 0.043 0.048* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Graduate 0.089*** 0.091*** 0.203*** 0.213*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Secondary Education 0.069*** 0.070*** 0.088*** 0.093*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Resident in the Centre -0.060** -0.057** 0.020 0.019 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Resident in the South -0.179*** -0.173*** -0.037* -0.045** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Wealth     
Illiquidity due to housing at t-1 - -0.021 - -0.050** 
 - (0.02) - (0.02) 
Financial assets (in 10,000€) at t-1 - 0.000 - -0.003** 
 - (0.00) - (0.00) 
Financial liabilities (in 10,000€) at t-1 - 0.003 - 0.000 
 - (0.00) - (0.00) 
Year YES YES  YES 
# observations 7,822 7,625 7,822 7,625 
# individuals 3,582 3,507 3,582 3,507 
Pseudo R2 0.120 0.120 0.173 0.175 
P value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
χ2 321.87 322.54 816.96 799.65 
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.01, ** p<0.005, *** p<0.001 
The marginal effects (MEMs) are calculated at the average values of the covariates in the sample.  






Table 8: Probability of a transition from out of the workforce into the workforce 
interacting income shock and illiquidity at t-1 
Pr(Y=1) Y=1: Employed Y=1: Active 
Income Shock at illiquidity=0.0 0.061 0.062 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Income Shock at illiquidity=0.2 0.069** 0.072** 
 (0.03) (0.04) 
Income Shock at illiquidity=0.4 0.077*** 0.082*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Income Shock at illiquidity=0.6 0.085*** 0.091*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Income Shock at illiquidity=0.8 0.093** 0.101*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Income Shock at illiquidity=1.0 0.101*** 0.111** 
 (0.034) (0.04) 
Year YES YES 
Demographics YES YES 
Wealth YES YES 
# observations 7,626 7,626 
# individuals 3,507 3,507 
The marginal effects (MEMs) are calculated at the average values of the covariates in the sample.  
All models include the following controls: dummy variable equal to one if the individual is a female, a second order polynomial 
in age, dummies for marital status (couple as the baseline), a dummy for the presence of children under the age of 5 within the 
household, a dummy for the presence of an adult aged 65 or over in the household, household size, dummy for head of household, 
dummies for high and medium educational attainment (low education as the baseline), year and geographical dummies. Both 
models also include the indicator for illiquidity due to housing at t-1, financial assets and financial liabilities (in 10,000 €) at t-1. 
 
Figure 3: Differential adjusted probabilities of a transition into the workforce at 
representative values of (lag) illiquidity due to housing, by Income Shock 





5. Sensitivity analyses and robustness checks 
 
Three are the main types of sensitivity/robustness checks we consider important for our 
investigation.  
 
First of all, since our investigation period covers both a normal cycle phase and a recessionary 
one, we want to see whether the results change across these two different periods. To this end, 
we run regressions over the 2004-2008 and 2008-2012 separately. Results in Table 9 show that 
the sensitivity of labour supply to the labour conditions of other family members is actually 
strongly increased in the period of the recession which started in 2008. Indeed, in the first period 
there is low to no significant effect of an income shock on labour supply before 2008, while the 
other independent variables keep the same signs already found in Tab. 6. Why such a change in 
the reaction to an income shock? Before the crisis, the job loss by a family member could be 
considered as a transitory phenomenon that soon could be reversed, but with the strong increase 
in the unemployment rate, the probability of finding a new job after losing one is lower, and this 
pushes other family members to look for a job, so as to increase the joint probability of obtaining 
income from work for the family as a whole. Similarly, with good general economic conditions 
the children can remain dependent and inactive even after the parents lose their jobs, but if the 
condition of unemployment of parents lasts for a long time, some children may be forced to look 
for a job.  
 
Second, to compare with the literature on the “added worker effect”, we distinguish among two 
very different groups of people: housewives vs. all inactive family members (Table 10). The 
sample of cases with the dependent variable equal to one shrinks, so the results are less well 
defined; however, the positive effect of an income shock at the household level turns out to be 
significant also for this subgroup. It seems therefore that some women have started to look for a 
job after their husbands have lost theirs. As expected, the probability of a transition is reduced if 
there are very young children in the family (significant only for a transition into the workforce), 
and it is higher for the more educated women, who find more convenient and easier to join the 
workforce.  
 In order to ensure that the effect of an income shock is robust even for the other half of the 




upon request) confirm the robustness of our previous estimates, since students living in 
households hit by an income shock are significantly more likely to enter the labour force than 
students living in households not hit by a shock. 
 
Finally, we split the variable Income shockjt into its two components, job loss and income 
support (redundancy/mobility/unemployment benefits), to disentangle possibly different or even 
opposite effects. Theoretically, if the loss of income due to unemployment (or 
underemployment) of one household member is compensated by publicly provided benefits, the 
need for another household member to enter the labour force would be lower, hence we might 
expect a negative sign. However, if the level or duration of benefits is not sufficient to 
compensate for the loss of income, then other household members may still react by increasing 
their labour supply, hence we might have a positive sign. 
 
Table 11 shows the results from separating the two income shocks. The precision of the 
estimates is lower than before since the number of cases where the dependent variable takes 
unitary value is lower than before, but the effects of both income shocks remain positive and 
significant, and also close in value.  
 
The fact that the coefficient on benefits is positive and statistically significant brings some 
evidence against a discouraging effect of unemployment insurance on the job search of other 
household members. This is in opposition to the findings of Cullen and Gruber (2000) and 
Bingley and Walker (2001), but in line with their reasoning, since it reflects the different 
incentives embedded in the Italian welfare system. Indeed, the duration of basic unemployment 
insurance in Italy is limited (one of the shortest among OECD countries, together with the UK) 
and the level of unemployment benefits does not depend on the income of other members, but 
depends solely on contributions, and therefore may not lead to relevant perverse incentives; the 
regression with both shocks present at the same time does not provide a significant result, due to 
the very limited number of cases6.   
                                                 
6 It must be stressed that, in building the first measure of composite income shock, we use the inclusive meaning of 




Table 9: Sensitivity analyses - Separate time periods 
Pr(Y=1) Y=1: Employed Y=1: Active 
 2004-2012 2004-2008 2008-2012 2004-2012 2004-2008 2008-2012 
 MEMs MEMs MEMs MEMS MEMs MEMs 
Income Shock 0.085*** 0.065* 0.088*** 0.091*** 0.060 0.104**** 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) 
Demographics      
Female  -0.095*** -0.125*** -0.076*** -0.122*** -0.118*** -0.114*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Age & Age squared(a) 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.006** 0.011*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Single  0.199*** 0.166*** 0.234*** 0.397*** 0.295*** 0.435*** 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) 
Divorced 0.115 0.099 0.130 0.302*** 0.262* 0.316*** 
 (0.08) (0.12) (0.08) (0.09) (0.14) (0.09) 
Widow(er) 0.105 0.027 0.097 0.245 0.043 0.252* 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15) (0.19) (0.15) 
With children aged <5 0.012 -0.004 -0.003 -0.029 -0.013 -0.050 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
At least one over 65 in HH -0.015 -0.015 -0.011 0.058* 0.053 0.062* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Household Size -0.016* -0.014 -0.014 -0.006 -0.008 -0.001 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Head 0.057** 0.047 0.071** 0.048* 0.054 0.069** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Graduate 0.091*** 0.091** 0.080*** 0.213*** 0.237*** 0.209*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Secondary Education 0.070*** 0.071*** 0.076*** 0.093*** 0.084*** 0.103*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Resident in the Centre -0.057** -0.038 -0.067** 0.019 -0.001 0.028 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Resident in the South -0.173*** -0.158*** -0.183*** -0.045** -0.056** -0.043* 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Wealth       
Illiquidity due to housing at t-1 -0.021 -0.014 -0.021 -0.050** -0.060** -0.051** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Financial assets (in 10,000€) at t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.003** -0.002 -0.003* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Financial liabilities (in 10,000€) at t-1 0.003 -0.001 0.004* 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES 
# observations 7,625 3,590 5,923 7,625 3,590 5,923 
# individuals 3,507 2,298 3,105 3,507 2,298 3,105 
Pseudo R2 0.120 0.120 0.121 0.175 0.152 0.180
P value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
χ2 322.54 208.92 282.04 799.65 406.461 657.16 
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.01, ** p<0.005, *** p<0.001 
The marginal effects (MEMs) are calculated at the average values of the covariates in the sample.  
(a)  The marginal effects of Age include the effect of age squared.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
to zero only when none of these events occurs. Here the variable “two shocks” is equal to 1 only if both shocks are 





Table 10: Sensitivity analyses - All out of the workforce vs. housewives only 
Pr(Y=1) Y=1: Employed Y=1: Active 
 All inactive(a) 
Only Housewives 
(part of a couple) All Inactive(a) 
Only Housewives 
(part of a couple)
 MEMs MEMs MEMS MEMs 
Income Shock 0.085*** 0.037** 0.091*** 0.037** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Demographics     
Female  -0.095*** Omitted -0.122*** Omitted 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  
Age & Age squared(a) 0.009*** -0.005*** 0.010*** -0.007*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Single  0.199*** Omitted 0.397*** Omitted 
 (0.04)  (0.05)  
Divorced 0.115 Omitted 0.302*** Omitted 
 (0.08)  (0.09)  
Widow(er) 0.105 Omitted 0.245 Omitted 
 (0.14)  (0.15)  
With children aged <5 0.012 -0.022 -0.029 -0.044* 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
At least one over 65 in HH -0.015 -0.015 0.058* -0.011 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Household Size -0.016* -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Head 0.057** 0.022 0.048* 0.030** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) 
Graduate 0.091*** 0.049 0.213*** 0.087** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Secondary Education 0.070*** 0.020 0.093*** 0.029* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Resident in the Centre -0.057** -0.012 0.019 -0.007 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Resident in the South -0.173*** -0.072*** -0.045** -0.076*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Wealth     
Illiquidity due to housing at t-1 -0.021 -0.019 -0.050** -0.012 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Financial assets (in 10,000€) at t-1 0.000 0.000 -0.003** 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Financial liabilities (in 10,000€) at t-1 0.003 0.006*** 0.000 0.005** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year YES YES YES YES 
# observations 7,625 3,429 7,625 3,429 
# individuals 3,507 1,515 3,507 1,515 
Pseudo R2 0.120 0.080 0.175 0.092 
P value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
χ2 322.54 78.86 799.65 125.92 
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.01, ** p<0.005, *** p<0.001 
The marginal effects (MEMs) are calculated at the average values of the covariates in the sample.  
(a)  “All out of the workforce” includes: housewives, well offs, students and voluntary workers. 





Table 11: Probability of a transition into employment - Separate shocks 
Pr(Y=1) Y=1: Employed Y=1: Active 
 MEMs MEMs MEMs MEMS MEMs MEMs 
One shock: lost work 0.061**  0.059** 0.090***  0.090*** 
 (0.03)  (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03) 
One shock: benefits  0.056* 0.056*  0.114*** 0.113*** 
  (0.03) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.04) 
Two shocks: work+benefits   0.013   -0.002 
   (0.05)   (0.05) 
Demographics      
Female  -0.098*** -0.096*** -0.097*** -0.124*** -0.122*** -0.122*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Age & Age squared(a) 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Single  0.202*** 0.200*** 0.203*** 0.395*** 0.398*** 0.398*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Divorced 0.115 0.117 0.116 0.300*** 0.305*** 0.303*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) 
Widow(er) 0.107 0.111 0.108 0.249* 0.249* 0.248* 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
With children aged <5 0.012 0.010 0.013 -0.027 -0.030 -0.025 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
At least one over 65 in HH -0.016 -0.018 -0.015 0.057* 0.055* 0.059* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Household Size -0.015* -0.014 -0.016* -0.007 -0.004 -0.007 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Head 0.056** 0.059** 0.057** 0.048* 0.051* 0.049* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Graduate 0.089*** 0.087*** 0.089*** 0.214*** 0.208*** 0.215*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Secondary Education 0.070*** 0.068*** 0.071*** 0.094*** 0.090*** 0.095*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Resident in the Centre -0.058** -0.055** -0.058** 0.019 0.021 0.019 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Resident in the South -0.175*** -0.166*** -0.175*** -0.048** -0.038* -0.049** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Wealth       
Illiquidity due to housing at t-1 -0.020 -0.022 -0.021 -0.049** -0.053** -0.050** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Financial assets (in 10,000€) at t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Financial liabilities (in 10,000€) at t-1 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.000 -0.001 0.000
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES 
# observations 7,625 7,625 7,625 7,625 7,625 7,625 
# individuals 3,507 3,507 3,507 3,507 3,507 3,507 
Pseudo R2 0.120 0.119 0.121 0.173 0.173 0.174 
P value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
χ2 322.54 326.72 327.54 792.56 802.76 803.90 
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.01, ** p<0.005, *** p<0.001 






6. Concluding remarks  
Understanding the mechanisms through which households can adjust to an income shock, 
especially in periods of recession, is of great economic relevance. In this paper we focus on one 
possible reaction, namely a potential increase in labour supply. More specifically, we estimate 
whether inactive individuals living in households in which one member suffered an income 
shock are more likely to move from out of the labour force into employment or into workforce. 
In a lifecycle setting, the labour supply of secondary workers is affected by credit constraints, so 
we also take into account financial wealth and liabilities, as well as a measure of portfolio 
illiquidity due to housing. 
 
After accounting for standard socio-economic controls, our results show that households hit by a 
shock respond by increasing labour supply, as the probability of a transition into employment is 
7.7 percentage points higher compared to households which were not hit by an income shock. 
The effect is even stronger if we consider the probability of a transition into the workforce, with 
individuals living in a household hit by an income shock 9.1 percentage points more likely to 
become active than individuals living in households in which nobody suffered an income shock. 
Despite the fact that most individuals who transit from inactivity to either employment or to the 
workforce are women, their relative success rate compared to men is much lower. The 
probability of a transition into employment or into the workforce is concave in age and higher in 
the presence of an income shock. It is also significantly increasing with years of education and 
for those who live in the Northern area of Italy, where the number of job opportunities is greater.  
 
As for portfolio controls, they are not significant in explaining transition into employment. 
However, they are relevant in explaining the decision to become active. As expected, the level of 
financial assets reduces the probability of entering the workforce, because households’ savings 
can be used to compensate for the reduction in disposable income. While the relationship is 
negative for both household groups (hit and not hit), households hit by a shock are less affected 
by their portfolio illiquidity, with a substantially higher probability of a transition both into 





Overall, we do not find a trade-off between unemployment benefits and labour supply of 
secondary earners, which suggests that the Italian unemployment insurance system does not 
provide distortionary incentives on other family members, while we cannot rule out the 
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Appendix A – Income definitions  
Payroll Income refers to the income of payroll workers, including fringe benefits. 
Self-employment Income includes both income from self-employment and entrepreneurial 
income. SE income refers to the members of a profession, individual entrepreneurs, self-
employed workers, workers on atypical contracts and owners or employees in a family business. 
Entrepreneurial income refers to owners, working shareholders or partners in a business or firm. 
Pension Income includes pensions and arrears. 
Transfer Income includes financial assistance (i.e. income from redundancy benefits, mobility 
benefits and unemployment benefits), scholarships, alimonies and gifts (both paid and received).  
Property Income includes actual and imputed rents from Real Estate. The variable “Imputed 
rents” is defined as the amount homeowners would receive in case they decided to rent out the 
property. It refers both to the house they live in (either owned, in usufruct or rent free) and to any 
second homes the household might own. 
Income from Financial Assets includes interest on deposits, interest on government securities, 










Yit (Employed)  Binary variable equal to 1 if the individual transited from out of the workforce 
into employment at time t and/or he/ she remained employed after a transition, 
and zero otherwise 
Yit (Active) Binary variable equal to 1 if the individual transited from out of the workforce 
into the workforce at time t and/or he/ she remained employed after a transition, 
and zero otherwise 
Inactive Binary variable equal to 1 if the individual was a housewife/homemaker, student, 
voluntary worker or rentier at time 1 
Income shock (composite)  Binary variable equal to 1 if the individual i is part of a household j in which at 
least one member has suffered an income shock (either became involuntarily 
unemployed or received income support or both) from time t onwards 
One shock: lost work Binary variable equal to 1 if the individual i is part of a household j in which at 
least one member has transited from employment into unemployment from time t 
onwards 
One shock: benefits Binary variable equal to 1 if the individual i is part of a household j in which at 
least one member has started receiving income support from time t onwards 
Female Binary variable equal to 1 if the individual is a female, 0 if male 
Age / Age 2 Integer variables representing the age of the individual (values between 15 and 
65) and its squared term. 
Marital status Discrete variable equal to: 
1 if the individual is married (baseline) 
2 if the individual is single  
3 if the individual is divorced  
4 if the individual is widow(er)  
With children <5 Binary variable equal to 1 if at least one child under the age of 5 is present in the 
household 
At least one over 65 in HH Binary variable equal to 1 if at least one adult over the of 65 is present in the 
household 
Graduate Binary variable equal to 1 if the individual has a degree (3 years or more at 
university), 0 otherwise 
Second. Education Binary variable equal to 1 if the individual has secondary education, 0 otherwise 
Household Size Discrete variable ranging from 1 to 12 representing the number of household 
components 
Head of Household Binary variable equal to one if the individuals is responsible for the financial 
decision making, 0 otherwise 
Area Discrete variable equal to: 
1 If individual resident in the North of Italy (baseline) 
2 If individual resident in the Centre of Italy 
3 If individual resident in the South of Italy 
Illiquidity at t-1 Continuous variable ranging from 0 to 1 and is equal to the value of the first home 
over total (gross) wealth. The variable is lagged by one period 
Fin. Assets at t-1 (in 10,000s) Financial assets include deposits, government and other securities and trade 
credits or credit due from other households. The variable is continuous, rescaled 
(divided by 10,000) and lagged by one period 
Fin. Liabilities at t-1 (in 10,000s) Financial liabilities include liabilities to banks and financial companies (incl. 
mortgages), trade debt and debts towards other households. The variable is 









Summary statistics of the estimation sample 
 All
(a) Employed(b) Active(c) No transitions(d) 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Income shock (composite) (e) 0.13 0.33 0.17 0.38 0.16 0.37 0.11 0.31 
One hh member lost work(e) 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.33 0.13 0.34 0.10 0.30 
One hh member on benefits(e) 0.04 0.19 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.23 0.03 0.17 
Female 0.73 0.44 0.59 0.49 0.57 0.50 0.79 0.41 
Age 34.24 14.77 31.84 11.80 29.44 10.67 35.88 15.78 
Single 0.52 0.50 0.64 0.48 0.72 0.45 0.45 0.50 
Divorced 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.07 
Widow(er) 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.05 
With children <5 0.07 0.26 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.08 0.26 
At least one over 65 in HH 0.11 0.32 0.09 0.28 0.10 0.30 0.12 0.32 
Household Size 3.72 1.05 3.61 1.03 3.77 1.03 3.70 1.05 
Head of Household 0.13 0.34 0.17 0.37 0.12 0.32 0.13 0.34 
Graduate 0.10 0.30 0.18 0.39 0.21 0.40 0.06 0.24 
Second. Education 0.44 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.40 0.49 
Centre 0.16 0.37 0.19 0.40 0.18 0.38 0.16 0.36 
South 0.49 0.50 0.30 0.46 0.45 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Illiquidity at t-1 0.57 0.39 0.56 0.39 0.57 0.39 0.57 0.39 
Fin. Assets at t-1 (in 10,000s) 2.32 6.21 2.87 7.27 2.40 6.35 2.30 6.24 
Fin. Liabilities at t-1 (in 10,000s) 1.03 2.95 1.29 3.30 1.04 3.03 1.03 2.95 
Obs 7,620 984 2,002 5,381 
Source: SHIW 2008-2012, pooled sample. Weighted data.  
(a) Includes all individuals who were inactive when they entered the survey. 
(b) Includes all individuals who were inactive when they entered the survey and transited into employment. 
(c) Includes all individuals who were inactive when they entered the survey and transited into the workforce, but did not 
necessarily found employment. 
(d) Includes all individuals who were inactive when they entered the survey and remained inactive. 
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